Marshalling Principles from
The Marshall Morass by Rotman, Leonard
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 23 Issue 1 Article 1 
4-1-2000 
Marshalling Principles from The Marshall Morass 
Leonard Rotman 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leonard Rotman, "Marshalling Principles from The Marshall Morass" (2000) 23:1 Dal LJ 5. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Leonard Rotman" Marshalling Principles From The
Marshall Morass
The Marshall case is the latest in a long series of Supreme Court of Canada
decisions concerned with the interpretation of treaties between the Crown and
aboriginal peoples in Canada. While the majority and minority judgments agreed
on the principles of treaty interpretation to be applied in the case, the significant
divergence in opinion between the majority and minority decisions provides
important commentary on the differences between articulating and applying
these principles. The Marshall case is also noteworthy for the manner in which it
addresses similarities and differences pertaining to aboriginal and treaty rights.
Because of these various traits, the Marshall case is a microcosm of the
increasing legal complexity of Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence and the
recent tendency of Canadian courts to engage in taxonomy ratherthan contextual
analysis.
La d6cision Marshall est la plus rcente d'une longue s6rie de d6cisions de la
Cour supreme ax6e sur I'interpr6tation des trait~s entre la Couronne et les
peuples autochtones du Canada. Les d6cisions de la majorit6 et de la minoritO
expriment un point de vue commun quant aux principes en cause mais elles
s'6cartentconsid6rablementlorsqu'ils?agitde 6finirlesparametres d'application
de ces principes dans la pratique. La d6cision Marshallest6galementintdressante
en raison des similitudes et des diff6rences qu'elle fait ressortir dans le droit des
autochtones et les droits issus des trait~s. Elle nous apparaft en quelque sorte
comme un microcosme de la probl6matique de plus en plus complexe des droits
des autochtones au Canada et illustre l'engouement r6cent des tribunaux pour
la taxonomie au detriment de I'analyse contextuelle.
* B.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., of the Ontario Bar. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,
University of Windsor.
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Conclusion
And I do further engage that we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any
Commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of such
Truck houses as shall be appointed or Established by His Majesty's
Governor at Lunenbourg or Elsewhere in Nova Scotia or Accadia.
"Truckhouse provision" in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship
between Gov. Charles Lawrence and Paul Laurent, Chief of the
LaHave tribe of Indians, March 10, 1760.
The appellant's position is that the truckhouse provision not only incorpo-
rated the alleged right to trade, but also the right to pursue traditional
hunting, fishing and gathering activities in support of that trade. It seems
clear that the words of the March 10, 1760 document, standing in isolation,
do not support the appellant's argument. The question is whether the
underlying negotiations produced a broader agreement between the Brit-
ish and the Mi'kmaq, memorialized only in part by the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship, that would protect the appellant's activities that are the subject
of the prosecution.
Binnie J. in R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at para. 7.
In determining the signatories' respective understanding and intentions,
the court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and linguistic differences
between the parties.
McLachlin J. in R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at para. 78.
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Introduction
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Marshall'
generated significant criticism, both of the decision itself and the role of
the Court. Some two months after the judgment was released, the
Supreme Court, in a rather unusual move, issued a lengthy explanation
and clarification of its judgment in Marshall in the context of dismissing
an intervener's motion for a rehearing of the Marshall appeal and stay of
the existing Supreme Court judgment pending that rehearing.2 Between
these two events, acts of violence towards aboriginal lobster fishers and
the destruction of their equipment cast a gloomy cloud over the effects of
the Marshall judgment and the more global issue of aboriginal access to
natural resources.
Treaties, by their nature, are consensual agreements between the
document's signatories that indicate the terms of at least a part of the
continuing relationship between them. The treaties that were in issue in
Marshall are, in this regard, no different than the numerous treaties
signed between the British Crown and aboriginal peoples across what is
now Canada between the 17th and 20th centuries. What is it, then, that
distinguishes the Marshall case from other recent Supreme Court judg-
ments on the interpretation of treaties such as R. v. Sundown3 and R. v.
Badger?4
The media attention and the sometimes violent disputes over access to
the lobster fishery (as well as over other natural resources such as timber)
between aboriginals, non-aboriginal groups, and government provides
one reason. Criticism of the majorityjudgment as creating law rather than
interpreting or applying it is yet another.5 The primary purpose of the
Supreme Court's deliberations in the Marshall appeal was to provide a
legal interpretation of the effects of the treaties in question in order to
ascertain whether they provided a valid defence to the charges laid against
Donald Marshall Jr. for harvesting eels out of season.6 However, in
determining these points, the Marshall case addressed other key issues
raised in recent Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence. These include
the notion of incidental rights, as previously discussed in the aboriginal
1. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter "Marshall, SCC'].
2. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [hereinafter "Marshall No. 2"].
3. [19991 1 S.C.R. 393 [hereinafter Sundown].
4. [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, [1996] 2 C.N.L.R. 77 [hereinafter Badger cited to C.N.L.R.].
5. For more discussion on this point, see LI. Rotman, "'My Hovercraft is Full of Eels':
Smoking Out the Message in R. v. Marshall" 63 Sask. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2000].
6. While the treaties in question were the Mi'kmaq Treaties of 1760-1, the trial judge relied
upon the March 10, 1760 treaty for its wording of the truckhouse clause that formed the basis
of Marshall's claim.
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rights context in R. v. Van der Peet7 and in the treaty rights context in
Simon v. R.8 and Sundown,9 and the justificatory regime for limiting
aboriginal rights created in R. v. Sparrow,0 expanded upon in R. v.
Gladstone," and applied to treaty rights in Badger."2 Thus, rather than
being a simple case of treaty interpretation, Marshall is a microcosm of
some of the most important recent determinations about the status of
aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada.
I. The Facts
Marshall, a Mi'krnaq 13 Indian and member of the Membertou First
Nation, whose reserve is located near Sydney, Nova Scotia, went fishing
for eels with a companion in Nova Scotia in 1993. While the act of fishing
for eels is not noteworthy in itself, the fact that the individuals in question
went fishing during closed season using illegal nets certainly was. After
catching some 463 pounds of eels, they sold them for $787.10. Marshall
did not possess a licence to fish, nor did he hold a licence to sell his catch.
He was charged with fishing without a licence, selling eels without a
licence, and fishing during closed season with prohibited nets. Marshall
claimed that the charges were improperly laid, insofar as he was exercis-
ing a treaty right to harvest and to sell the eels.
Initially, Marshall relied upon the Mi'kmaq Treaty of 1752 as the basis
for his defence. However, following the conclusion of the prosecution's
case, the basis of his treaty claim shifted to the Mi'kmaq treaties of 1760-
1. These treaties followed on the heels of similar treaties signed with the
Maliseet and Passamaquody First Nations. One particular clause of these
treaties, the "truckhouse clause," became the focus of his defence. This
truckhouse clause, as reproduced in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship
entered into by Governor Charles Lawrence and Paul Laurent, Chief of
the LaHave tribe at Halifax on March 10, 1760, was held to be illustrative
7. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
8. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 390 [hereinafter Simon cited to D.L.R.].
9. Supra note 3.
10. [19901 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Sparrow cited to D.L.R.].
11. [199612 S.C.R. 723, [1996] 4C.N.L.R. 65.
12. Supra note 4.
13. As noted in J.Y. Henderson, "Mi'kmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" (1995) 18 Dal. L.J.
196 at 198, note 8, while there are many different spellings for the Mi'kmaq, he uses the official
phonemic orthography of the Sant6 Mawiomi (Grand Council) of the Mi'kmaq. Thus, the word
"Mfkmaq" is singular and "Mikmaw" plural. In this article, the word "Mi'kmaq" is used to
denote both the singular and plural, as well as to maintain consistency with the spelling used
in current Canadian aboriginal law jurisprudence
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of the same clause that was included in all of the treaties signed during the
period in question. 4 The clause reads as follows:
And I [Laurent] do further promise for myself and my tribe that we will not
either directly nor indirectly assist any of the enemies of His most sacred
Majesty King George the Second, his heirs or Successors, nor hold any
manner of Commerce traffick nor intercourse with them, but on the
contrary will as much as may be in our power discover and make known
to His Majesty's Governor, any ill designs which may be formed or
contrived against His Majesty's subjects. And I do further engage that we
will not traffick, barter or Exchange any Commodities in any manner but
with such persons or the managers of such Truck houses as shall be
appointed or Established by His Majesty's Governor at Lunenbourg or
Elsewhere in Nova Scotia or Accadia. 15
To guarantee the Mi'kmaq performance of the treaty obligations, the
treaty stipulated that a minimum of two Mi'kmaq prisoners were to be left
as hostages with the colonial government.
This truckhouse clause had its genesis in the negotiations between the
Maliseet, Passamaquody, and the Governor of Nova Scotia on February
11, 1760. The following exchange was recorded in the minutes of the
meeting between the Governor and the Maliseet and Passamaquody:
His Excellency then demanded of them, Whether they were directed by
their Tribes, to propose any other particulars to be Treated upon at this
time. To which they replied that their Tribes had not directed them to
propose any thing further than that there might be a Truckhouse estab-
lished, for the furnishing them with necessaries, in Exchange for their
Peltry, and that it might, at present, be at Fort Frederick.
Upon which His Excellency acquainted them that in case of their now
executing a Treaty in the manner proposed, and its being ratified at the next
General Meeting of their Tribes the next Spring, a Truckhouse should be
established at Fort Frederick, agreable [sic] to their desire, and likewise
at other Places if it should be found necessary, for furnishing them with
such Commodities as shall be necessary for them, in Exchange for their
Peltry and that great care should be taken, that the Commerce at the said
Truckhouses should be managed by Persons on whose Justice and good
14. Curiously, the treaty in question did not apply to Marshall's band, but, as Embree Prov.
Ct. J. indicated in his judgment, [1996] N.S.J. No. 246 (Prov. Ct.) online: QL(NSJ) at para. 70
[hereinafter "Marshall, Prov. Ct."]:
By the end of 1761, it seems that all Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia had entered into separate
but similar treaties. Copies of some of those treaties have not been located and there may
be minor variations between some existing treaties because of errors made in transcrib-
ing copies. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that all of these Mi'kmaq treaties were
materially the same.
15. Cited in Marshall, SCC, supra note 1 at para. 5 [emphasis in original].
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Treatment, they might always depend; and that it would be expected that
the said Tribes should not Trafic or Barter and Exchange any Commodities
at any other Place, nor with any other Persons. Of all which the Chiefs
expressed their entire Approbation. [Emphasis added]' 6
Provisions for truckhouses were included in both the treaty with the
Maliseet and Passamaquody of February 23, 1760 and the later treaties
with the Mi'kmaq, including the treaty in question.
These truckhouses were trading posts established and operated under
the authority of the British Crown which provided the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet,
and Passamaquody peoples with preferential trading prices for goods
deemed to be "necessaries." These truckhouses lasted only a brief time,
being replaced by a system of government licensed traders. This later
system disappeared by 1780.17 What is curious about the truckhouse
clause in the treaty in question is that it only contains a negative covenant,
prohibiting the Mi'kmaq from engaging in the trade of commodities other
than through sanctioned British establishments. In contrast, the 1752
Mi'kmaq Treaty contained a positive affirmation of rights, holding that
the Mi'kmaq shall possess the "free liberty of hunting and Fishing as
usual."' 8
Marshall maintained that the truckhouse clause contained in the 1760-
1 treaties supported the existence of a Mi'kmaq right to trade at such
truckhouses. This right to trade, it was contended, included a right to
obtain goods to trade at those posts. The federal Crown argued that the
truckhouse clause merely served as a negative covenant precluding
Mi'kmaq trade with anyone other than persons appointed by the British.
Thus, in determining whether the charges in Marshall ought to stand, the
courts were faced with the task of interpreting the truckhouse clause to
ascertain whether it provided Marshall with a treaty right to harvest eels.
II. Judicial History
At trial, 9 Embree Prov. Ct. J. determined that the truckhouse clause
granted the Mi'kmaq a positive, though limited, right to "bring the
products of their hunting, fishing and gathering to a truckhouse to
trade."20 This right was limited insofar as the Mi'kmaq could trade only
16. Ibid. at para. 29.
17. Ibid. at para. 6. See also Marshall, Prov. Ct., supra note 14 at para. 117.
18. Interestingly, the 1752 treaty contemplates the existence of truckhouses in this same clause,
stating that "if they think a Truck house needful at the River Chibenaccadie, or any other place
of their resort they shall have the same built.... One of the potential difficulties in the application
of this treaty to Marshall, however, was whether it extended to Cape Breton, a matter that was
not resolved in the primary discussion of the 1752 treaty in Simon, supra note 8.
19. Marshall, Prov. Ct., supra note 14.
20. Ibid. at para. 116.
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at English truckhouses or with licensed traders. Furthermore, the trial
judge held that this right to bring goods to trade terminated with the end
of the truckhouse system. As he explained in his judgment:
It was a pre-requisite to the Mi'kmaq being able to trade under the terms
of the trade clause that the British provide truckhouses or appoint persons
to trade with. When the British stopped doing that, the requirement (or if
I had taken the Defence view, the option) to trade with truckhouses or
licensed traders disappeared. The trade clause says nothing about that
eventuality and it is my view that no further trade right arises from the trade
clause.2
In rejecting Marshall's claim that the treaties granted him a treaty right to
catch and sell fish, the trial judge held that such an interpretation was not
even among the "various possible interpretations of the common inten-
tion" of the Mi'kmaq and British in signing the treaty.
22
Upon appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the trial judge's
determination that the Mi'kmaq possessed a positive fight to bring the
fruits of their hunting, fishing and gathering to a truckhouse to trade was
overturned. The Court, per Roscoe and Bateman JJ.A., held that the effect
of the truckhouse clause upon the Mi'kmaq did not create a right to trade,
but was simply a "mechanism imposed upon them to help ensure that the
peace was a lasting one, by obviating their need to trade with enemies of
the British."23 Rather than creating a right to trade, the truckhouse clause
was said to merely permit the Mi'kmaq to trade at truckhouses. The Court
of Appeal concluded that when the truckhouse system ended, so too did
any treaty restrictions or entitlements belonging to the Mi'kmaq. The
appellate court agreed with the trialjudge' s determination that the treaties
did not confer a right to catch and sell fish. It based this determination on
the negative language of the truckhouse clause as well as the fact that, as
peace and friendship treaties rather than land cession treaties, no grant of
rights could be presumed to emanate from them.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority judgment,
rendered by Binnie J., LamerC.J.C., L' Heureux-Dub6, Cory, and lacobucci
JJ. concurring, held that the truckhouse clause had the result of providing
the Mi'kmaq with a treaty fight to obtain goods to trade through their
pursuit of traditional hunting, fishing, and gathering activities. This right
was found to have survived the termination of the truckhouse system and
its successor regime of government licensed traders and was an existing
treaty fight protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
21. Ibid. at para. 125.
22. Ibid. at para. 129.
23. (1997), 159 N.S.R. (2d) 186 at 208 (C.A.) [hereinafter "Marshall, CA"].
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While this right to obtain goods was affirmed in Marshall, it was
explicitly held to be subject to regulation by the Crown. Moreover, the
right was limited in its scope to the acquisition of "necessaries," or the
equivalent of a moderate livelihood, and did not extend to the "open-
ended accumulation of wealth.
24
Binnie J. explained that Marshall's appeal was allowed because
"nothing less would uphold the honour and integrity of the Crown in its
dealings with the Mi'kmaq people to secure their peace and friendship,
as best the content of those treaty promises can now be ascertained.
5
The result of these findings was that Marshall was acquitted on all
charges.
The dissenting judgment rendered by McLachlin J., Gonthier J.
concurring, held that the truckhouse clause conferred a limited right upon
the Mi'kmaq to bring goods to trade at locations established by the
British, but that this right existed only as long as the truckhouses or their
successors remained in place. More importantly, the dissenting judgment
found that the treaties "granted neither a freestanding right to truckhouses
nor a general underlying right to trade outside of the exclusive trade and
truckhouse regime. 21 6 It would have had the charges against Marshall
stand.
III. The Truckhouse Clause
The distinction between the majority and minority judgments in Marshall
may be understood through their respective approaches to the interpreta-
tion of the truckhouse clause. Each judgment appears to start from the
common understanding of treaties as unique agreements which ought to
be regarded as encompassing more than the written versions on parch-
ment authored by the Crown's representatives. Both judgments either
articulate or illustrate the canons of treaty interpretation that were
established and cited with approval in Supreme Court of Canada cases
such as Nowegijick,27 Simon, 82 Sioui,2 9 Badger3 ° and Sundown.3 In fact,
McLachlin J.'s dissentingjudgment provides a useful list of some of these
interpretive guidelines:
24. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 7.
25. Ibid. at para. 4.
26. Ibid. at para. 70.
27. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
28. Supra note 8.
29. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
30. Supra note 4.
31. Supra note 3. For a discussion of some of these interpretive canons, see L.I. Rotman,
"Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian Aboriginal Rights Jurispru-
dence" (1997) 46 U.N.B.L.J. 11 [hereinafter "Taking Aim"].
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This Court has set out the principles governing treaty interpretation on
many occasions. They include the following.
1. Aboriginal treaties constitute a unique type of agreement and attract
special principles of interpretation: R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R.
393, at para. 24; R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at para. 78; R. v.
Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, atp. 1043; Simon v. The Queen, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 404. See also: J. [Sdk6j] Youngblood Henderson,
"Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties" (1997), 36 Alta. L. Rev. 46; L.I.
Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights,
and the Sparrow Justificatory Test" (1997), 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149.
2. Treaties should be liberally construed and ambiguities or doubtful
expressions should be resolved in favour of the aboriginal signato-
ries: Simon, supra, at p. 402; Sioui, supra, at p. 1035; Badger, supra,
at para. 52.
3. The goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from among the various
possible interpretations of common intention the one which best
reconciles the interests of both parties at the time the treaty was
signed: Sioui, supra, at pp. 1068-69.
4. In searching for the common intention of the parties, the integrity and
honour of the Crown is presumed: Badger, supra, at para. 41.
5. In determining the signatories' respective understanding and inten-
tions, the court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and linguistic
differences between the parties: Badger, supra, at paras. 52-54; R. v.
Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, at p. 907.
6. The words of the treaty must be given the sense which they would
naturally have held for the parties at the time: Badger, supra, at paras.
53 et seq.; Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, at p. 36.
7. A technical or contractual interpretation of treaty wording should be
avoided: Badger, supra; Horseman, supra; Nowegijick, supra.
8. While construing the language generously, courts cannot alter the
terms of the treaty by exceeding what "is possible on the language"
or realistic: Badger, supra, at para. 76; Sioui, supra, at p. 1069;
Horseman, supra, at p. 908.
9. Treaty rights of aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a static
or rigid way. They are not frozen at the date of signature. The
interpreting court must update treaty rights to provide for their
modem exercise. This involves determining what modern practices
are reasonably incidental to the core treaty right in its modern
context: Sundown, supra, at para. 32; Simon, supra, at p. 402.32
Of the various principles of treaty interpretation listed by McLachlin
J. in Marshall, herjudgment appears to focus primarily on points 3, 6, and
8. Her emphasis on these points-in particular, on ensuring that the
interpretation of a treaty does not exceed "what is possible on the
32. Marshall, SCC, supra note 1 at para. 78.
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language or realistic"-is responsible for her conclusion that no general
right to obtain goods to trade existed under the truckhouse clause.33
However, in the context of the Marshall decision, there is a more than
passing appearance of conflict between McLachlin J.'s use of these
points and some of the other principles of treaty interpretation she
articulates. In particular, there is a semblance of friction between her
judgment and point #2-that treaties should be liberally construed and
ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be resolved in favour of the
aboriginal signatories.
In her dissent, Justice McLachlin expressly holds that the treaties of
1760-1 "completely displaced" the Mi'kmaq Treaty of 1752."4 While
that conclusion may have been Britain's understanding of the effect of the
latter treaties, it is completely antagonistic to the manner in which the
Mi'kmaq viewed them.35 Perhaps more importantly, the 1752 treaty
defence was abandoned by Marshall early in the trial proceedings, thus
rendering the treaty's application to the case inconsequential. While the
1752 treaty may have become irrelevant in the context of the Marshall
appeal, McLachlin J.'s comments about this treaty indicates that she
favoured the British understanding of treaties over and at the direct
expense of the Mi'kmaq understanding, which is quite relevant to the
Marshall case. Although Marshall had abandoned his reliance on the
1752 treaty, he did not concede that the 1760-1 treaties superseded the
former. Equally, Marshall's lack of reliance on the 1752 treaty does not
33. As she stated, ibid. at para. 108, "it is difficult to see how a government obligation to
provide trading outlets could be stretched to include a treaty right to fish and a treaty right to
trade the product of such fishing with private individuals." [Emphasis added] Note also her
statement, ibid. at para. 105, that:
[T]he different wording of the two treaties [1752 and 1760-1 ] cannot be supposed to
have gone unperceived by the parties. To conclude that the parties would have
understood that a general right to trade would be revived in the event that the exclusive
trade and truckhouse regime fell into disuse is not supportable on the historical record
and is to "exceed what is possible on the language", to paraphrase from Sioui, supra.
34. Ibid. at para. 105.
35. Further discussion on this point will be found in the text accompanying notes 39-54,
below.
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compel the conclusion reached by McLachlin J.36 For these reasons, it is
worthwhile to consider the interplay between the 1752 and 1760-1
treaties, as well as the relationship between treaties more generally.
In spite of her emphasis on maintaining the honour of the Crown,
3 7
McLachlin J.'s conclusion as to the effect of the 1760-1 treaties upon the
1752 treaty is inconsistent with the honour of the Crown or the notion of
resolving ambiguities in the interpretation of treaties in favour of the
aboriginals. If Britain and the Mi'kmaq held divergent notions of the
meaning and intention of the 1760-1 treaties vis-A-vis the 1752 treaty,
then those differing notions suggest the existence of an ambiguity in the
purpose or intention of the treaties. While this divergence of understand-
ing with regard to the purpose of the treaties would not qualify as a
"doubtful expression," it is most certainly an ambiguity and, as such,
ought to receive the benefit of that particular canon of treaty interpreta-
tion.
In such circumstances, according to principle #2 in McLachlin J.' s list,
the benefit of the doubt ought to accrue to the aboriginals' understanding.
Of course, the purpose of point #8-ensuring that, while construing the
language of a treaty generously, courts do not alter the treaty's meaning
by exceeding "what is possible on the language or realistic"-is to place
a check upon the scope of any liberal and generous interpretation of a
treaty. In other words, while the benefit of ambiguity is to fall to the
aboriginal party to a treaty, a court may not extend the meaning of the
treaty beyond what is reasonable given the circumstances surrounding
the treaty. Ascertaining what is reasonable includes accounting for the
intentions and understandings held by the parties at the time of the
agreement. Given the considerations that must be taken into account, this
determination is entirely site and fact-specific.
36. Indeed, the comments by Bruce Wildsmith, counsel for Donald Marshall, in a 1995 article
demonstrate this sentiment:
Since between 1725 and 1761 all of the various groups of Mi'kmaq from all over
present-day Nova Scotia, including Cape Breton Island, signed treaties with the
English, and the Mi'kmaq beneficiaries of those treaties intermarried and moved
throughout the region, we may conclude that all Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia today enjoy
a fight to fish based on the covenant chain of treaties. In all likelihood, all Mi'kmaq
enjoy the same set of fights based on the covenant chain, and that set of fights includes
the right to sell fish, as expressly set out in the treaties in 1725-26, 1752 and 1779, and
as impliedly included in the trading provisions in 1760-61.
See B.H. Wildsmith, "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery: Beyond Food Requirements" (1995) 18
Dal. L.J. 116 at 123.
37. Further discussion of this point will be found in Part IV, "The Honour of the Crown,"
below.
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Ascertaining what amounts to a "reasonable understanding" of any
agreement necessitates the objective and value-neutral assessment of the
subjective expectations and understandings of the parties at the time of
the treaty. It also requires, in some circumstances, an elaboration or
extension of the treaty beyond what was actually contained therein. Such
a circumstance may exist where a treaty is silent on a matter that bears
significantly on other elements of the treaty. If the 1760-1 treaty is to be
regarded as a separate and discrete entity from earlier Crown-Mi'kmaq
treaties, as McLachlin J.'s judgment indicates, then the failure of the
treaty to address the parties' agreed-upon position regarding the exercis-
ing of hunting, fishing and gathering by the Mi'kmaq is a glaring
omission that must be addressed. As indicated below, this interpretation
of the place of the 1760-1 treaty vis-A-vis those earlier treaties is
problematic.
While McLachlin J. suggests that the historical record indicates that
the Mi'kmaq possessed both an understanding of the importance of the
written word to the British in the treaty making process as well as a
sufficiently sophisticated knowledge of that process to be able to discern
the differences between treaties,38 her judgment does not reveal any
recognition of the manner in which the Mi'kmaq traditionally regarded
treaties. This would appear to conflict with point #5 and its emphasis on
sensitivity to the unique cultural and linguistic differences between the
parties when determining the signatories' respective understandings of a
treaty or intentions in negotiating it.
The Mi'kmaq traditionally regarded treaties as integral elements in the
fostering of harmonious relations with other nations. Thus, they entered
into such agreements with other aboriginal nations and with European
nations.39 However, they did not view each individual treaty as an end
unto itself. Rather, each treaty was regarded as a link in a chain of
agreements-some agreed to in the past, others yet to be signed-that
established the parameters of nation-to-nation relations with other inde-
38. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 89. This same conclusion is reached by the trial
judge: see Marshall, Prov. Ct., supra note 14 at paras. 105-08.
39. See Union of Nova Scotia Indians, The Mi'kmaq Treaty Handbook, (Sydney & Truro,
N.S.: Native Communications Society of Nova Scotia, 1987) preface at i:
Well before the arrival of Europeans, formal agreements equivalent to treaties were
negotiated between sovereign nations of North America. The meaning and effect of
these arrangements were not limited by a few words on paper as are present-day
business contracts. Rather, these treaties were living and evolving relationships among
various indigenous nations. Like the members of a family, representatives of the nations
that had entered into a treaty met from time to time to exchange gifts, forgive one another
and renew their friendship. We, the Mi'kmaq, related to Europeans the same way.
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pendent groups. 40 In this way, an individual treaty both built upon earlier
treaties and was built upon by subsequent ones. Contemporary descrip-
tions of the Maritime peace and friendship treaties by the Mi'kmaq
illustrate this understanding:
The eighteenth century agreements between the Mi'kmaq nation and
Britain were, and still are, regarded by us as a form of brotherhood. When
there was some injury or threat of conflict we met to exchange reassur-
ances and renew our engagements. That is why, over several decades, one
finds half a dozen or more seemingly separate treaties between the
Mi'kmaq and the British Crown. The surviving documents are often
incomplete summaries of meetings that typically required many days and
were repeated every few years as necessary. By themselves, the documents
are fragments; considered together, they constitute a great chain of
agreement. In other words, the treaty documents.., should be seen not as
distinct treaties but as stages and renewals of a larger agreement or pact that
developed during the 1700s between the Mi'kmaq and the British.
4
1
The Mi'kmaq understanding of treaties and their relationship to one
another follows the same pattern that sits as the foundation of the
relationship between Britain and the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) Confed-
eracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Beginning with the
Treaty of Albany, 1664,42 the nations entered into a series of compacts
whose purpose was to establish, reaffirm, and renew their relationship.
This series of compacts became known as the Covenant Chain. The
imagery of the chain reflected the strength of the bond between the
nations; it also permitted the adding of "links" through the extension of
treaty relations with other aboriginal nations. When parties joined the
Covenant Chain alliance, the image used to indicate their entry was the
placing of their arms through one of the chain's links:
We have not much to give or say but return our hearty thanks for the good
you do us, as we have always been in the Covenant chaine, but of late New
England, Virginia, Maryland and adjacent Collonys did not put in their
annes into the chain; pray animate them to make us strong, and assist us
according to the Covenant made between us and altho' an angry Dog
40. See, for example, Wildsmith, supra note 36 at 117.
41. Mi'kmaq Treaty Handbook, supra note 39, preface at i. See also W.C. Wicken, "'Heard
It From Our Grandfathers': Mi'kmaq Treaty Tradition and the Syliboy Case of 1928" (1995)
44 U.N.B.L.J. 145; Grand Chief D. Marshall Sr., Grand Captain A. Denny, Putus S. Marshall,
of the Executive of the Grand Council of the Mi'kmaw Nation, "The Covenant Chain" in B.
Richardson, ed., Drumbeat: Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill
Press, 1993).
42. "Articles between Col. Cartwright and the New York Indians," 24 September 1664, as
reproduced in E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State
of New York, 11 vols., (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1853-61), vol. 3 at 67-68 [hereinafter
"NYCD"].
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should come and endeavour to bitt the chaine in peices with his teeth, yet
we will keep it firme both in peace and warr and do renue the Old Covenant,
that so that tree of wellfare, may flourish and that his Roots may spread
thro' all the Country.43
The symbolic effect of having Britain and the aboriginal nations place
their arms through the Covenant Chain and grasping it tightly demon-
strates that the chain was regarded by the parties as an alliance that existed
only through the cooperation of independent nations."
In spite of the permanency and strength of the Covenant Chain, both
symbolically and in reality, it was expected that the parties would
regularly renew their respective undertakings. 45 As Henderson explains:
The Aboriginal Nations conceived of Treaties as living agreements rather
than mere documents .... To preserve the kinship, as within a natural
family, the Aboriginal nations and the representatives of the King were
obliged to meet from time to time to renew the friendship, to reconcile
misunderstandings, and to share with each other understandings, experi-
ences and wealth. Thus most of the treaties were in reality renewal
ceremonies of subsisting relationships. In documentary form these cer-
emonies mostly consisted of a transcript of the proceedings and the
substance of the agreement summarizing the nature of the international
kinship. This was often characterized by the metaphor of the chain.46
This process of renewal was often described as the "polishing" of the
chain. Such polishing came in different forms: sometimes, it was accom-
plished through the exchange of presents or belts of wampum; at other
times, it involved a restating of the nations' solidarity, commitments of
further undertakings of union, or the extension of the chain to include
other aboriginal groups. If, however, the chain was neglected through a
lack of renewed commitment, it would be described as "tarnished" or
43. "The Maquasse propose for themselves," New York Colonial Manuscripts, XXXVII, as
reproduced, ibid., vol. 3 at 779 [in response to "His Excellcy the Governor's answer to the
Maquasse, Oneydes, Onnondages, Cayouges and Sinnekes and Skachkook Indians, at Albany
the 4th day of June 1691," ibid. at 778].
44. See P.C. Williams, The Chain (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School 1982) [unpub-
lished] at 64: "The Covenant Chain is also characteristic of Iroquois symbols in that it is
designed so that no one nation has preeminence: each nation with its arms in the chain is equal
to the other.... Though some nation might have specific functions in maintaining or renewing
the chain, the equality of the nations within it is an important part of its power and strength."
45. Ibid. at 65.
46. Henderson, supra note 13 at 240.
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"rusted" and thus subject to weakening or breaking altogether.47 This
vision of the polishing of the Covenant Chain was described to Sir
William Johnson, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs at a general
congress at Fort Stanwix in November, 1768:
We remember that on our first Meeting with you, when you came with your
ship we kindly received you, entertained you, entered into an alliance with
you, though we were then great & numerous and your people inconsider-
able and weak and we know that we entered into a Covenant Chain with
you and fastened your ship therewith, but being apprehensive the Bark
would break and your ship be lost we made one of iron, and held it fast that
it should not slip from us, but perceiving the former chain was liable to rust;
We made a silver chain to guard against it Then, Brother, you arose,
renewed that chain which began to look dull, and have for many years
taken care of our affairs by the command of the Great King, & you by your
labors have polished that chain so that it has looked bright and is become
known to all Nations, for all which we shall ever regard you and we are
thankfull to you in that you have taken such care of these great affairs of
which we are allways mindfull, and we do now on our parts renew and
strengthen the Covenant Chain by which we will abide so long as you shall
preserve it strong & bright on your part.48
The representations of Lieutenant-Governor Jonathan Belcher to the
Mi'kmaq in 1760, following the conclusion of the Seven Years' War
between the British and French, demonstrates that the imagery of the
Covenant Chain was a fundamental part of the Mi'kmaq understanding
of the treaty-making process with Britain. At that time, a delegation of
Mi'kmaq from British and French jurisdictions met with Belcher and the
Legislative Assembly to renew and extend the Wabanaki Compact
(1725), which had itself renewed earlier treaties dating back to 1693. 49
Belcher began his representations by describing the protection and
allegiance that had been established under the 1752 treaty. "Protection
47. Note, for example, "Report of Proceedings with the Confederate Nations of Indians, at
a Conference held at Canajohary," 4 April 1759, as reproduced in NYCD, supra note 42, vol.
7 at 388:
. .I do now therefore, in the name of the great King of England, my master & in behalf
of all his Subjects Your Bretheren by this Belt renew, strengthen and brighten that
Ancient Coy' Chain, and in his Name & on their parts, I do assure you it shall be held
so fast & the terms of it so punctually observed that you shall have no just cause to
reproach us; The Sun now shines clear upon us & while we hold this Cov Chain firmly
in our hands & are careful to keep it from contracting any Rust we shall be able to drive
away all Clouds which may attempt to come between us, & continue to see & smile upon
each other as Bretheren ought to do.
48. "At a General Congress with the several Nations at Fort Stanwix Tuesday Nov. I st 1768,"
as reproduced in NYCD, supra note 42, vol. 8 at 126.
49. For further discussion of the Wabanaki Compact and its relationship to other treaty
relations in the Maritimes, see Henderson, supra note 13.
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and allegiance are fastened together by links," he said. In continuing with
this imagery, Belcher explained that "[i]f a link is broken the chain will
be loose. You must preserve this chain entire on your part by fidelity and
obedience to the Great King George the Third, and then you will have the
security of his Royal Arm to defend you."5 Upon the conclusion of an
agreement, Belcher and the district chiefs buried the hatchet and removed
the war paint from their bodies to indicate that peace had been agreed to
and to bar any future reference to the hostilities thus concluded.51 Belcher
then stated that peace had been concluded "by these solemn instructions
to be preserved and transmitted to you with charges to your Children's,
never to break the Seals or Terms of this Covenant."52 As a result of this
exchange, Henderson concludes that "the metaphor of the 'Covenant
Chain' entered into Mi'kmaw sacred order.
5 3
From the Mi'kmaq perspective, then, it may be seen that the 1760-1
treaty was not an isolated agreement, but part of a long series of treaties
between Britain and the Mi'kmaq dating back to the late seventeenth
century.54 For these reasons, it ought not be assumed that the 1760-1
treaty superseded the 1752 treaty unless it can be shown that that effect
was the common intention of the parties. Given the Mi'kmaq perspective
on treaty relationship, it is unlikely that such intent was held by them. For
this reason, there can be no element of "commonality" in the understand-
ing of the parties on this point.
The fact that the 1760-1 treaties did not mention the renewal of
previous treaties while the treaty of February 23, 1760 with the Maliseet
and Passamaquody did expressly contemplate a renewal of earlier com-
pacts does not conclusively determine whether the Mi'kmaq understood
the 1760-1 treaties as having incorporated earlier compacts.55 Minutes of
a meeting of February 29, 1760 with the Governor and Council record the
following exchange, which occurred with Paul Laurent and Michel
Augustine:
50. "Jonathan Belcher" Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1979) at 51, as quoted in Henderson, supra note 13 at 257.
51. Henderson, supra note 13 at 258, note 239.
52. Ibid. at 258.
53. Ibid.
54. Note the treaty of 11 August 1693, as reproduced in P.A. Cumming & N.H. Mickenberg,
NativeRights in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, 1972) at 295-96.
55. Before such a conclusion may be appropriately reached, it must b.e asked, for instance,
whether all of these treaties were written by the same person under the same circumstances, or
whether the person who took notes at the treaty negotiations was the same person who penned
the final written version of the treaty.
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His Excellency then Ordered the Several Articles of the Treaty made with
the Indians of St. John's River and Passamaquody to be Communicated to
the said Paul Laurent and Michel Augustine who expressed their satisfac-
tion therewith, and declar'd that all the Tribe of Mickmacks would be glad
to make peace upon the same Conditions. 6
While the trial judge accepted and relied upon this evidence, as well as
expert evidence indicating Mi'kmaq treaty-making traditions which
affirmed the Covenant Chain model, he nevertheless concluded that the
1760-1 treaties did not renew earlier treaties.5 7 However, the trial judge
did find that these Mi'kmaq treaties made peace "upon the same condi-
tions" as the earlier Maliseet and Passamaquody treaty.58 It would seem
reasonable, without any indication to the contrary, to assume that "mak-
ing peace on the same terms" would include the entire terms of the
Maliseet and Passamaquody treaty, which included an express ratifica-
tion of earlier treaties.
The trial judge based his conclusion, in part, on the fact that Paul
Laurent "spoke English and would have understood the terms of the
treaty he and the other two Sakamow signed on March 10th [and] would
also have recognized the different wording and format in the Maliseet and
Passamaquody treaty. 59 What is not revealed here is whether the terms
of the Maliseet and Passamaquody treaty that were communicated to
Laurent at the February 29th meeting described above were read to him
or shown to him. Also, we do not know whether Laurent, who "spoke
English," spoke it well, possessed a sophisticated understanding of the
language, or could read English. If he did not possess a sophisticated
understanding of English and could not read, how would he have
recognized the different wording and format in the Maliseet and
Passamaquody treaty? Are we to assume that the mere fact that Laurent
spoke English entailed that he could discern the subtle60 distinctions
between the treaties? Again, we have the presence of ambiguity here.
It would appear that the only solid evidence indicating that the 1760-
1 treaties were the same as the Maliseet and Passamaquody treaty, save
for the renewal of earlier agreements, is the absence of any express
renewal in the former. If, however, the earlier treaty was not shown to
Laurent, then one cannot be sure of the manner in which it was explained
56. Marshall, Prov. Ct., supra note 14 at para, 101.
57. Ibid. atpara. 105.
58. Ibid. at para. 108.
59. Ibid. at para. 106.
60. This distinction would have been subtle if Laurent's understanding of treaties was that
they were always part of a larger series of compacts, which would have been commonly held
by the Mi'kmaq, as discussed earlier.
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to him or in how much detail. In any event, if Laurent's understanding of
treaties was that they were part of a larger series of compacts, then the
absence of explicit wording indicating such would not have provided him
with reason for concern. Given that earlier treaties and negotiations
between the British and the Mi'kmaq did make reference to earlier
compacts, it could be argued that a precedent had been set which could
only be deviated from by express indication of such a change. The simple
absence of written terms expressly indicating the incorporation of previ-
ous treaties would not qualify as an express indication of change when the
agreements were drafted by the British using their language. Ambiguities
in contracts, as per the contra proferentem rule in contract law, are always
interpreted against the party that drafted them. Finally, Binnie J.'s
majority judgment in Marshall indicated that the 1760-1 treaties were
intended to have been consolidated into a comprehensive Mi'kmaq treaty
that was never brought into existence. 61 This suggests that the individual
treaties may have been incomplete, given that they were going to be
brought under an umbrella treaty that was never executed.
The nature of the representations made to the Mi'kmaq by the British
Crown's representatives is also of considerable importance in ascertain-
ing the common intentions of the parties regarding the 1760-1 treaty.
These representations are the key to ascertaining Britain's obligations
under the treaty and the Mi'kmaq understanding of how Britain viewed
the treaty. What the Lords of Trade or other high-ranking British colonial
administrators at Whitehall thought the effect of the treaty was is not
relevant if it was not incorporated into the representations made to the
Mi'kmaq. The agreements between the parties were signed by the
Mi' kmaq on the basis of the actual representations made by Crown's
representatives, not the thoughts or perceptions of officials back in
Britain. Thus, if it could be demonstrated that the representations made
to the Mi'kmaq linked the 1760-1 treaty to earlier treaties, such as the
1752 treaty, then the former ought to be understood to incorporate the
terms of the earlier treaties. 62 For these reasons, although McLachlin J.'s
judgment appears to rely more overtly on these interpretive canons, their
effects are more apparent within Binnie J.'s majority judgment.
Binnie J.'s emphasis on what the Nowegijick judgment described as
the "large, liberal and generous" principles of treaty interpretation
resulted in his placing considerable emphasis on the circumstances under
which the treaty was signed, the parties' respective positions and inter-
61. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 5.
62. Refer back to the discussion on this point, above, in the text accompanying notes 49-54.
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ests, and the relationship between the parties' treaty negotiations and the
final written product produced. For these reasons, he affirmed the use of
extrinsic evidence, even absent any ambiguity on the face of the treaty.
63
He also held that it would be unconscionable in circumstances such as in
Marshall, where the treaty in question was concluded verbally and
written up after the fact by the Crown's representatives, for the Crown to
ignore the oral agreements made while adhering only to the terms its
representatives included on the parchment copy of the treaty.64 Binnie J.
took pains, however, to distinguish the use of such generous interpretive
rules from what he described as "a vague sense of after-the-fact lar-
gesse.
' 65
The use of these interpretive canons is necessary, according to Binnie
J., because of the "special difficulties" of ascertaining what the parties
had agreed to, as well as the fact that the aboriginal groups did not have
their own written record of the negotiations. 66 Thus, he explained that
certain assumptions are to be made by courts regarding:
i. the Crown's approach to treaty making (honourable), and
ii. the Crown's approach to treaty interpretation (flexible, based on the
Crown's approach to treaty making) as to:
iii. the existence of a treaty,
iv. the completeness of any written record, and
v. the interpretation of treaty terms once they are found to exist.
67
At the end of the day, Binnie J. held that the court's function is "to 'choose
from among the various possible interpretations of the common intention
[at the time the treaty was made] the one which best reconciles' the
interests of the Mi'kmaq and those of the British Crown."6 8
Based on these interpretive requirements, Binnie J.'s majority judg-
ment held that the written treaty did not truly represent the totality of the
63. Citing, with approval, thejudgments in R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d)
227 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter "Taylor and Williams, CA"], Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 and Sioui, supra note 29. The issue of extrinsic evidence will be discussed
in greater detail in Part V, "The Use of Extrinsic Evidence," below.
64. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 12.
65. Ibid. at para. 14.
66. Ibid. It may be observed that Binnie J.'s remarks about the aboriginal peoples' lack of
written documentation regarding treaty negotiations is an indication of the privileging of
written over oral accounts of events that is a fundamental element of the law of evidence. The
bias exhibited by the common law of evidence towards literacy is not necessarily based on the
objective and inherent superiority of written versus oral record keeping. Rather, it may be seen
to be based largely on the values and practices of the cultures which imbued the written word
with such importance, particularly in comparison with oral accounts.
67. Ibid. para. 14.
68. Ibid.
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treaty negotiations, insofar as it did not set out any Mi'kmaq rights, but
imposed negative restrictions on their activities. Thus, he held that the
trial judge's finding that the written treaty, generously interpreted,
encompassed all of Britain's obligations to the Mi'kmaq was in error. He
maintained that that finding not only failed to provide adequate weight to
the concerns and perspective of the Mi'kmaq, but placed excessive
emphasis on the concerns and perspective of the British.69 The fact that
Britain "held the pen" was not ajustifiable reason for skewing the balance
of British and Mi'kmaq interests in ascertaining the common intention of
the parties. 70 Not surprisingly, Binnie J. also found that the narrow
construction of the written treaty by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was
not an adequate reflection of the parties' common intention. These factors
all have a bearing on the discussion of the "honour of the Crown" found
in both judgments in Marshall.
IV. The Honour of the Crown
Both the majority and dissenting judgments in Marshall refer to the
"honour of the Crown" in discussing the principles to be used when
interpreting Crown-Native treaties. Acknowledging the role of the honour
of the Crown in this context is not novel to the Marshall decision. Recent
Supreme Court considerations of treaties, such as Badger7' and Sun-
down,72 also note that the honour of the Crown must be considered in the
context of treaty interpretation. This recognition is not an entirely recent
phenomenon, though. The honour of the Crown in the treaty context has
been recognized in some Canadian treaty rights cases dating back to the
nineteenth century. Indeed, Binnie J. expressly refers to the dissenting
judgment of Gwynne J. in Province of Ontario v. Dominion of Canada
and Province of Quebec: In re Indian Claims, where he stated:
[W]hat is contended for and must not be lost sight of, is that the British
sovereigns, ever since the acquisition of Canada, have been pleased to
adopt the rule or practice of entering into agreements with the Indian
nations or tribes in their province of Canada, for the cession or surrender
by them of what such sovereigns have been pleased to designate the Indian
title, by instruments similarto these now under consideration to which they
have been pleased to give the designation of "treaties" with the Indians in
possession of and claiming title to the lands expressed to be surrendered
by the instruments, and further that the terms and conditions expressed in
those instruments as to be performed by or on behalf of the Crown, have
69. Ibid. at para. 19.
70. See text accompanying note 104.
71. Supranote4.
72. Supra note 3.
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always been regarded as involving a trust graciously assumed by the
Crown to the fulfilment of which with the Indians the faith and honour of
the Crown is pledged, and which trust has always been most faithfully
fulfilled as a treaty obligation of the Crown.
73
In that same case, Sedgewick J. added to Justice Gwynne's sentiment
when he explained that "in all questions between Her Majesty and 'Her
faithful Indian allies' there must be on her part, and on the part of those
who represent her, not only good faith, but more, there must be not only
justice, but generosity. 74 Prior to these early judicial statements, Sir
William Johnson, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, indicated
the need to maintain the honour of the Crown in a letter to the Lords of
Trade in 1756:
At this critical and interesting conjecture I am sensible the utmost attention
should be paid to our Indian Alliance and no measures left untried that may
have the least tendancy [sic] to strengthen and increase it. Wherefore I
would humbly propose a steady and uniform method of conduct, a
religious regard to our engagements with them a more unanimous and
vigorous exertion of our strength than hitherto, and a tender care to protect
them and their Lands against the insults and encroachments of the
Common enemy as the most and only effectual method to attach them
firmly to the British Interest, and engage them to act heartily in our favour
at this or any other time.
75
Although, as Binnie J.'s judgment in Marshall indicates, the notion
that treaties implicate the honour of the Crown has been recognized by
Canadian courts as far back as the latter part of the nineteenth century, it
is important to note that an equal number of decisions have come to the
opposite conclusion. Binnie J.'s judgment does not illustrate the exist-
ence of this fundamental duality.
While Gwynne J. did recognize that the honour of the Crown is
enmeshed in its treaty dealings with aboriginal peoples, hisjudgment was
a dissenting one. In the appeal of the Re Indian Claims decision to the
Privy Council, Lord Watson expressly contradicted this notion of treaty
promises incorporating the honour of the Crown when he stated that
"Their Lordships have had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that,
under the treaties, the Indians obtained no right to their annuities...
beyond a promise and agreement, which was nothing more than a
73. [1896] 25 S.C.R. 434 at 511-12 [hereinafter "Re Indian Claims"], as cited in Marshall,
SCC, supra note 1 at para. 50. See also Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold (1901), 32 S.C.R. I at
2, as cited in Marshall, SCC, ibid.
74. Re Indian Claims, supra note 73 at 535.
75. "Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, Fort Johnson, 8 March 1756," as reproduced
in NYCD, supra note 42, vol. 7 at 43.
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personal obligation by its governor .... ",76 Lord Watson had expressed
a similar sentiment almost ten years earlier in St. Catherine's Milling and
Lumber Co. v. The Queen, in which he explained that aboriginal peoples'
interest in their lands was a "personal and usufructuary right, dependent
upon the good will of the sovereign. '77 His statement in the Re Indian
Claims appeal that the treaty annuity promise was not legally binding, but
only a political obligation of the governor was later cited, with approval,
in both R. v. Wesley
78 and R. v. Sikyea. 79
It was only with the British Columbia Court of Appeal's judgment in
R. v. White and Bob in 1964 that Crown-Native treaties began to be more
regularly recognized as solemn commitments that implicated the honour
of the parties involved.8" Shortly thereafter, in R. v. George, Cartwright
J. indicated that treaty obligations were intertwined with the notion of the
honour of the Crown:
We should, I think, endeavour to construe the treaty of 1827 and those Acts
of Parliament which bear upon the question before us in such manner that
the honour of the Sovereign may be upheld and Parliament not made
subject to the reproach of having taken away by unilateral action and
without consideration the rights solemnly assured to the Indians and their
posterity by treaty.81
While Binnie J.'s majority judgment in Marshall makes repeated refer-
ence to the need to uphold the honour of the Crown by providing an
expansive and contextual interpretation of the truckhouse clause,
McLachlin J.'s dissenting judgment states only that the integrity and
honour of the Crown is presumed when searching for the common
intention of the parties in a treaty context. 82
76. [1897] A.C. 199 at 213 (P.C.).
77. (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54 (P.C.). A similar sentiment had been expressed by Justice
Taschereau in the Supreme Court of Canada' s judgment in St. Catherine's Milling andLumber
Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 649:
The Indians must in the future.., be treated with the same consideration for their just
claims and demands that they have received in the past, but, as in the past, it will not be
because of any legal obligation to do so, but as a sacred political obligation, in the
execution of which the state must be free from judicial control.
78. [1932] 4 D.L.R. 774 at 788 (Alta. C.A.): "In Canada the Indian treaties appear to have
been judicially interpreted as being mere promises and agreements. See A.-G. Can. v. A.-G.
Ont. (Indian Annuities case), [ 1897] A.C. 199 at 213."
79. (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 at 154 (N.W.T.C.A.): "While this [Lord Watson's statement
in the Re Indian Claims case] refers only to the annuities payable under the treaties, it is difficult
to see that the other covenants in the treaties, including the one we are here concerned with, can
stand on any higher footing."
80. (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.).
81. [1966] S.C.R. 267,55 D.L.R. (2d) 386 at 396-97.
82. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 78. At para. 110, McLachlin J. also states that "[t]he
honour of the Crown is presumed and must be upheld."
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It appears, then, that while both judgments emphasize the importance
of the honour of the Crown, the dissent views the Crown's honour solely
as a governing principle to be used when interpreting treaties generally.
In other words, from this latter perspective, it is not to be presumed that
the Crown intended to act dishonourably when looking at the terms or
intent of a treaty. McLachlin J. indicates this understanding of the place
of the honour of the Crown in the context of Crown-Native treaties by her
favourable reference to the Badger judgment, where Cory J. stated that:
[T]he honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Indian
people. Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an
impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner
which maintains the integrity of the Crown. It is always assumed that the
Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appearance of "sharp dealing" will
be sanctioned. 3
A similar sentiment was expressed in the Sikyea case,84 where a
conflict existed between promises made under Treaty No. 11, signed in
1921, and the domestic implementation of the Migratory Birds Conven-
tion, 1916.85 In his judgment in Sikyea, Johnston J.A. acknowledged the
tenuous status of treaties in the early stages of the twentieth century, but
nevertheless reasoned that the Crown, in removing treaty promises made
to the signatories to Treaty No. 11 through its implementation of the
Migratory Birds Convention Act, could not have done so deliberately, but
through sheer mistake.86 As he explained:
It is, I think, clear that the rights given to the Indians by their treaties as they
apply to migratory birds have been taken away by this Act and its
Regulations. How are we to explain this apparent breach of faith on the part
of the Government, for I cannot think it can be described in any other
terms?... I cannot believe that the Government of Canada realized that in
83. Badger, supra note 4 at 92. This statement was also cited, with approval, by Binnie J. in
Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 49.
84. Supra note 79.
85. Specifically, the sanction, ratification and confirmation of the Convention by Canada
through the Migratory Birds Convention Act, S.C. 1917, c. 18 and the Convention's implemen-
tation into Canadian domestic law through the Migratory Birds Convention Act, R.S.C. 1952,
c. 179.
86. R.S.C. 1952, c. 179. While Johnson J.A. does not refer to the "clear and plain" test, that
was the standard that existed for the infringement or extinguishment of treaty rights prior to
their constitutional protection in the Constitution Act, 1982.
28 The Dalhousie Law Journal
implementing the Convention they were at the same time breaching the
treaties that they had made with the Indians. It is much more likely that
these obligations under the treaties were overlooked-a case of the left
hand having forgotten what the right hand had done. 7
In contrast to the dissent's view in Marshall that the honour of the
Crown is to be presumed in the context of treaties, the majority's view of
the honour of the Crown requires not only that the Crown be presumed
to have acted honourably throughout its treaty negotiations with aborigi-
nal peoples, but also that the "honour of the Crown" tints the interpreta-
tion of specific clauses of treaties to ensure that those clauses are
meaningful when examined in the overall context of the treaty and the
common intention of the parties in entering into it. In this manner, Binnie
J.'s majority judgment is similar to the unanimous judgment of the Court
in Sparrow, in which it was made clear that section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 incorporates the Crown's fiduciary obligations to
aboriginal peoples."
Therefore, while the Marshall judgment does not introduce the under-
standing that the honour of the Crown plays an important role in the
interpretation of Crown-Native treaties, it does provide significant com-
mentary on the Supreme Court's understanding of the role of the honour
of the Crown in treaty interpretation. The two judgments in Marshall
demonstrate that, while the honour of the Crown is acknowledged as
being involved in treaty interpretation, its precise role is the subject of
some contention. As Binnie J.'s judgment indicates, though, the majority
of the Court has endorsed the notion that the honour of the Crown plays
an active role in the interpretation of treaties rather than serving merely
as a guiding principle, as indicated by McLachlin J.'s judgment. For this
reason, he distinguished between the interpretation of the truckhouse
clause in the context of an eighteenth century Crown-Native treaty versus
an ordinary commercial situation in the following manner:
87. Supra note 79 at 158. In ruling that the conviction against Mr. Sikyea for shooting a
migratory bird out of season must be sustained, Johnson J.A. made the following statement,
ibid. at 162:
In coming to this conclusion, I regret that I cannot share the satisfaction that was
expressed by McGillivray J.A. in R. v. Wesley [supra note 78] when he was writing his
judgment dismissing the appeal in that case:
It is satisfactory to be able to come to this conclusion and not to have to decide that "the
Queen's promises" have not been fulfilled. It is satisfactory to think that legislators have
not so enacted but that the Indians may still be "convinced of ourjustice and determined
resolution to remove all reasonable cause of discontent."
88. Supra note 10 at 408-9.
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While I do not believe that in ordinary commercial situations a right to
trade implies any right of access to things to trade, I think the honour of the
Crown requires nothing less in attempting to make sense of the result of
these 1760 negotiations.8 9
The need to extrapolate beyond the literal meaning of the truckhouse
clause-something that would not be required in the ordinary commer-
cial context-is therefore rooted in the nature of the relationship between
the Crown and the Mi'kmaq and the context in which the agreement was
negotiated and signed rather than out of any gratuitous sense of benevo-
lence.90 This is what incorporating the "honour of the Crown" into the
interpretation of treaties is truly about.
V. The Use of Extrinsic Evidence
By determining that the truckhouse clause carried with it both a right to
bring goods to trade and the right to obtain goods that could be traded, the
majority relied considerably on the use of extrinsic evidence. Consistent
with this reliance on extrinsic evidence, Binnie J.'s judgment reveals the
majority's emphasis on the context in which the treaty was negotiated and
signed. Indeed, he questioned "whether the underlying negotiations
produced a broader agreement.., memorialized only in part by the Treaty
... that would protect the appellant's activities that are the subject of the
prosecution."' This approach to interpreting the treaty differed signifi-
cantly from that taken by the Court of Appeal, which had held that
"[w]hile treaties must be interpreted in their historical context, extrinsic
evidence cannot be used as an aid to interpretation, in the absence of an
ambiguity."92
Binnie J. held that the Court of Appeal's prohibition on the use of
extrinsic evidence absent an ambiguity ought to be rejected for at least
three reasons. He demonstrated that, even in modem commercial con-
texts, extrinsic evidence could be used to indicate that a written document
is not inclusive of all the terms agreed to.93 Also, he indicated that recent
cases had determined that extrinsic evidence relating to the historical and
cultural context of a treaty could be received absent the existence of an
89. Marshall, SCC, supra note 1 at para. 44.
90. This was indicated earlier by Binnie J. when he stated, ibid. at para. 14 that "'Generous'
rules of interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-the-fact largesse," as
referred to, supra note 65.
91. Ibid. at para. 7. For this reason, even though Binnie J. found that, under a strict
interpretation of the truckhouse clause viewed in isolation, there was no basis for holding that
a right to obtain goods for trading existed, he stated that this limited examination was not
sufficiently extensive to provide the basis for a final determination on the treaty's meaning.
92. Marshall, CA, supra note 23 at 194. It is legitimate to ask how a treaty may be interpreted
in its historical context if no evidence outside of the four corners of the treaty is to be used.
93. Marshall, SCC, supra note 1 at para. 10.
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ambiguity in the treaty.94 Finally, he cited the case of Guerin v. R. 95 for
its proposition that where the Crown agrees to certain oral terms and later
produces a written agreement which excludes those terms, it would be
unconscionable to allow the Crown to ignore the oral terms, yet rely on
the written terms. 96
Justice Binnie recognized that the Court of Appeal' s findings on the
use of extrinsic evidence were premised largely upon the precedent in R.
v. Horse,9 7 where Estey J. held that such evidence was not to be used
absent an ambiguity in the treaty itself. However, Binnie J. held that the
more flexible approach to interpretation emphasized by Lamer J., as he
then was, in R. v. Sioui and affirmed by Cory J. in Badger was more
appropriate in the context of treaty relationships. As he explained:
"Generous" rules of interpretation should not be confused with a vague
sense of after-the-fact largesse. The special rules are dictated by the special
difficulties of ascertaining what in fact was agreed to. The Indian parties
did not, for all practical purposes, have the opportunity to create their own
written record of the negotiations. Certain assumptions are therefore made
about the Crown's approach to treaty making (honourable) which the
Court acts upon in its approach to treaty interpretation (flexible) as to the
existence of a treaty (Sioui, supra, at p. 1049), the completeness of any
written record (the use, e.g., of.context and implied terms to make
honourable sense of the treaty arrangement: Simon v. The Queen, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 387, and R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393), and the interpre-
tation of treaty terms once found to exist (Badger). The bottom line is the
Court's obligation is to "choose from among the various possible interpre-
tations of the common intention [at the time the treaty was made] the one
which best reconciles" the Mi'kmaq interests and those of the British
Crown (Sioui, per Lamer J., at p. 1069) (emphasis added).98
In considering the context of the treaty, Binnie J. noted that the March
10, 1760 treaty did not mention the right to hunt and fish "as usual," as
had been included in the 1752 Mi'kmaq Treaty that formed the basis of
the arguments in Simon.99 Rather, the former simply contained a negative
94. See the references accompanying note 63.
95. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 388.
96. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 12.
97. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 187 at 201. The Court of Appeal did not cite the Horse case, but referred
to its principles by quoting its mention in the Sioui case, supra note 29. In fact, neither Horse,
nor the post-Sioui case of R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299, in which the use of extrinsic
evidence was again rejected, notwithstanding what was said to the contrary in Sioui, were
referred to by the Court of Appeal in its judgment in Marshall.
98. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 14.
99. Supra note 8. As Binnie J. explained, evidence of Mi'kmaq alliances with France post-
1752 and post-treaty hostilities between the Mi'kmaq and the British "apparently persuaded
the appellant at trial to abandon his reliance on the 1752 Peace and Friendship Treaty":
Marshall, SCC, supra, note I at para. 16.
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covenant that prevented the Mi'kmaq from trading with Britain's en-
emies. The evidence that had been accepted by the trial judge was that it
was "inherent in these treaties that the British recognized and accepted the
existing Mi'kmaq way of life" and that "the British would have wanted
the Mi'kmaq to continue their hunting, fishing and gathering lifestyle" so
that they would not "become a long-term burden on the public trea-
sury."' '0 Justice Binnie found it difficult to accept the trial judge's
conclusions that, while the Mi'kmaq possessed treaty rights to "bring the
products of their hunting, fishing and gathering to a truckhouse to
trade,"'' the written 1760-1 treaties "contain, and fairly represent, all the
promises made and all the terms and conditions mutually agreed to."'
0 2
As he noted, "[i]t cannot be supposed that the Mi'kmaq raised the subject
of trade concessions merely for the purpose of subjecting themselves to
a trade restriction."0 3 As a result, Binnie J. concluded that the trial judge
erred in failing to give adequate weight to the "concerns and perspective"
of the Mi'kmaq people while giving excessive weight to the concerns and
perspective of the British "who held the pen."1 14
Binnie J. held that the trial judge's "overly deferential attitude" to the
treaty was "inconsistent with a proper recognition of the difficulties of
proof confronted by aboriginal people," both in the treaty and aboriginal
rights contexts.'0 5 According to Justice Binnie, this overly narrow view
of what constituted "the treaty" led the trial judge to determine, in an
equally narrow fashion, that the Mi'kmaq entitlement to trade terminated
in the 1780s.10 6 Meanwhile, he overturned the Court of Appeal's finding
that the canons of treaty interpretation developed in connection with land
cession treaties were of "limited specific assistance" to peace and
friendship treaties.0 7 As he explained, "[al deal is a deal. The same rules
of interpretation should apply."'0 °
In examining the context of the treaties, he relied upon the testimony
of the Crown's expert witness, Dr. Stephen Patterson, the experts of the
appellants, Dr. John Reid and Dr. William Wicken, as well as the trial
judge's findings founded on that evidence. Based on the historical
evidence presented, the trial judge had concluded that the 1760-1 treaties
were the culmination of more than a decade of intermittent Mi'kmaq-
100. Marshall, Prov. Ct., supra note 14 at para. 116.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid. at para. 112.
103. Marshall, SCC, supra note 1 at para. 19.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid. at para. 20.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid. at para. 21.
108. Ibid.
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British hostilities."o Justice Binnie concluded that the primary purpose
of the treaties was to secure peace between the combatants, which was to
be obtained by arranging trade relations between them." 0 This purpose
was expressed by Governor Lawrence to the Board of Trade on May 11,
1760, when he stated that "the greatest advantage from this [trade] Article
... is the friendship of these Indians."m According to Binnie J., this peace
was to be maintained by ensuring that the Mi'kmaq could remain
economically self-sufficient. For this reason, Britain sought to protect the
traditional Mi'kmaq economy, which included hunting, fishing, and
gathering, and ensured their ability to trade the fruits of their endeavours
to obtain European trade goods such as blankets, clothing, gun powder
and shot."2
The creation of six truckhouses occurred following the signing of the
1760-1 treaties."' The advantageous terms offered to the Mi'kmaq at
these truckhouses were regarded by Binnie J. as "an investment in peace
and the promotion of ongoing colonial settlement.""' 4 However, he
concluded that, on the basis of Dr. Patterson's testimony at trial, the only
way this strategy of ensuring peace would work was to protect Mi'kmaq
access to trading and to the resources necessary to provide them with
goods to trade." 5 The trial judge's determination that the right to obtain
goods to trade ceased upon the termination of the truckhouse system and
its successor regime was said by Binnie J. to be in error and based upon
the trial judge's overly deferential attitude to the written treaty.
Binnie J.' s inference of a treaty right to hunt, fish, and gather from the
context of the March 10, 1760 treaty was supported by his reliance on the
"officious bystander test" from contract law, whereby courts may imply
a contractual term on the basis of the parties' presumed intentions where
such action is necessary to assure the efficacy of the contract. As he stated:
109. Marshall, Prov. Ct., supra note 14 at para. 80.
110. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 25.
111. As quoted, ibid. at para. 32.
112. Ibid. at para. 25.
113. Ibid. at para. 32.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid. As he stated later in his judgment, at para. 35, "[tjhe trade clause would not have
advanced British objectives (peaceful relations with a self-sufficient Mi'kmaq people) or
Mi'kmaq objectives (access to the European 'necessaries' on which they had come to rely)
unless the Mi'kmaq were assured at the same time of continuing access, implicitly or explicitly,
to wildlife to trade."
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If the law is prepared to supply the deficiencies of written contracts
prepared by sophisticated parties and their legal advisors in order to
produce a sensible result that accords with the intent of both parties, though
unexpressed, the law cannot ask less of the honour and dignity of the
Crown in its dealings with First Nations." 6
He then cited the Sioui and Sundown cases as examples of treaty cases
where the Court found the need to expand beyond the literal terms of a
written treaty." 
7
McLachlin J., on the other hand, did not find that there was a need to
expand the truckhouse clause to include rights other than the negative
right to trade only at British truckhouses. As she stated, the treaty clearly
limited the ability of the Mi'kmaq to trade other than with the British
under the regime established by treaty. She held that the historical record
demonstrated that neither the Mi'kmaq nor the British intended or
understood the truckhouse clause to have created a general right to
trade." 8 She also determined that the post-treaty conduct of the parties
warranted reaching the same conclusion."" As she explained:
The treaty reference to the right to bring goods to truckhouses was required
by and incidental to the obligation of the Mi'kmaq to trade with the British,
and cannot be stretched to embrace a general treaty right to trade surviving
the exclusive trade and truckhouse regime. To do so is to transform a
specific fight agreed to by both parties into an unintended right of broad
and undefined scope. 2 °
The fact that McLachlin J.'s finding had the effect of turning the
Mi'kmaq into "citizens minus" with greater restrictions, but no greater
liberties, than British subjects was not deemed to be of any consequence
since she held that that was the arrangement freely entered into by the
Mi'kmaq.' 2' Yet, while McLachlin J. did not find that the truckhouse
clause was properly interpreted in the manner proposed by the majority
judgment, her judgment nonetheless indicates her reliance on extrinsic
evidence to support her conclusions. Therefore, both the majority and
dissenting judgments indicate that the use of extrinsic evidence to
116. Ibid. at para. 43.
117. Ibid. at para. 44. Further discussion of this point will be found in Part VI, "Incidental
Rights," below.
118. Ibid. at para. 96.
119. Ibid. at para. 99.
120. Ibid. at para. 102.
121. The term "citizens minus" was used by Binnie J. at para. 45 of his judgment in Marshall,
SCC, ibid. and is a play on the phrase "citizens plus" coined by the 1966 Hawthorn Report on
Indian conditions in Canada, which used the phrase to indicate the fact that aboriginal peoples
in Canada possess all of the rights of non-aboriginal Canadians plus special aboriginal and
treaty rights not possessed by those others: see H.B. Hawthorn, ed., A Survey of the
Contemporary Indians of Canada, 2 volumes (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1966, 1967).
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interpret treaties is proper and necessary to reveal the true intentions and
understandings of the parties.
The need to look to extrinsic evidence is premised on the notion that
the written versions of treaties do not necessarily capture the entirety of
agreements made between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. Ignoring
extrinsic evidence has the effect of privileging the Crown's perspective
over the perspectives of the aboriginal signatories, insofar as the Crown's
representatives were the ones who penned the written terms of the
treaties. 22 Using extrinsic evidence allows for the incorporation of
evidence that indicates the aboriginal perspective on the meaning of the
treaty, as well as contextual evidence, in the forms of either oral history,
wampum belts, or written accounts by treaty negotiators or other people
associated with the signing of treaties that also assists in the process of
interpretation. The use of extrinsic evidence also provides for the inclu-
sion of the "necessary implications" of a treaty provision, also known as
"incidental rights."
VI. Incidental Rights
The majority judgment in Marshall confirms that rights that are inciden-
tal to, or a necessary sub-component of, treaty rights are, themselves,
protected rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This
principle had previously been approved in both Sundown and Simon.
What this meant in the context of Marshall was that the treaty right to
bring goods to trade at truckhouses, or their successors, entailed a further
right to obtain goods that could be brought to the truckhouses for trading
purposes. As Binnie J. stated, possessing a right to bring goods to trade
is meaningless without a corresponding right to obtain goods that could
be brought to trade. As he explained it, "[t]he trade arrangement must be
interpreted in a manner which gives meaning and substance to the
promises made by the Crown.
1 23
These incidental Mi'kmaq rights to obtain goods to trade were found
not to be dependent on the continued existence of the truckhouse or its
successor regimes. This finding was premised upon the rejection of
frozen rights theory that had been sanctioned by the Supreme Court on
122. Other difficulties associated with relying exclusively upon the written terms of treaties
may be seen in "Taking Aim," supra note 31.
123. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 52.
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numerous instances. 24 The effect of this conclusion was summed up by
the majority's statement that "where a right has been granted, there must
be more than a mere disappearance of the mechanism created to facilitate
the exercise of the right to warrant the conclusion that the right itself is
spent or extinguished."'25 This statement may be seen to be similar in
effect to the "clear and plain" test for the extinguishment of aboriginal or
treaty rights.
The "clear and plain" doctrine of extinguishment is a fundamental part
of Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence. It requires a demonstration
of a clear and plain intention on the part of the Crown to extinguish the
rights in question for that extinguishment to be effective.'26 Such inten-
tion may exist, for example, in a treaty, or via legislation. What is not
sanctioned, then, is either the idea of "extinguishment by regulation" or
"extinguishment by implication." The majority's finding in Marshall that
the incidental rights to obtain goods to trade outlived the truckhouse
system is synonymous with the ineffectiveness of "extinguishment by
regulation" or "extinguishment by implication." Had the majority not
held that the rights in question outlived the truckhouse system, then, by
implication, the rights could have been extinguished by an initiative that
was not "clear and plain."
These "incidental" rights to obtain goods to trade that were found to
exist by the majority judgment in Marshall were not unlimited, but
restricted in their scope to the garnering of a moderate livelihood that did
not include the accumulation of wealth. Such a moderate livelihood was
said to include basics such as food, clothing, and housing, which could be
"supplemented by a few amenities," as was held in the Gladstone'27
case. 28 While this moderate livelihood was not restricted to bare subsis-
tence, it extended only to day-to-day needs.2 9 The majority did not,
however, define what would constitute a reasonable livelihood, either in
the context of the Marshall case or more generally. Instead, it stated that
catch limits that would produce a reasonable livelihood based on contem-
124. Note, for example, Simon, supra note 8, Sparrow, supra note 10, and Badger, supra note
4, among others, which hold that the exercise of aboriginal or treaty rights may not be restricted
to the historic manner in which they had been used by aboriginal peoples. In addition to
determining that the right was not restricted to its exercise in conjunction with trading activities
at truckhouses, the majority's rejection of frozen rights theory also entailed that the Mi'kmaq
could not demand the restoration of the truckhouse system: see Marshall, SCC, supra note I
at para. 53.
125. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 54.
126. See, for example, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [ 1973] S.C.R. 313,
34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 210; Sparrow, supra note 10 at 401.
127. Supra note 11.
128. Marshall, SCC, supra note 1 at para. 59.
129. Ibid.
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porary standards could be established by regulation and enforced without
violating the treaty right. 30
What is interesting about the sanctioning of incidental rights in
Marshall is that such action, while consistent with the earlier Sundown
case,'31 appears to contradict the principle established in Van der Peet. 1
32
In that case, in the context of aboriginal rights, Lamer C.J.C. held that
practices, customs, or traditions that "piggyback" on aboriginal rights are
not protected by section 35(1). Neither Sundown nor Marshall addressed
this apparent inconsistency.
Ought it to be assumed, based on the sanctioning of incidental rights
in Marshall, Sundown, and the earlier treaty case of Simon, coupled with
the rejection of incidental rights in Van der Peet that practices incidental
to treaty rights are protected rights under section 35(1) while practices
necessary to the use of aboriginal rights are not similarly protected?
Existing precedent would appear to indicate that this is, indeed, the case.
The fact that the rationale for the rejection of incidental rights in Van der
Peet was not addressed in either Marshall or Sundown would seem to
buttress this assumption.
The contemplation of "necessarily incidental" rights associated with
treaties is equally important to the exercise of aboriginal rights where the
ability to make use of the right in question requires engaging in a
particular practice to facilitate the exercise of the right. One example of
necessarily incidental rights associated with an aboriginal right may be
seen in the Jack and Charlie case.'33
In Jack and Charlie, the appellants, members of the Coast Salish
Nation, were convicted of hunting deer out of open season. At the request
of one of their relatives, the appellants had killed a deer for use in a
ceremony in which the burning of raw deer meat was required.'34 The
appellants insisted that the killing of the deer was necessary in order to
carry out the ceremony. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that it had
not received sufficient evidence to indicate either that the deer was killed
as part of the ceremony or that fresh deer meat was required. The only
restriction on the method of obtaining the deer meat presented in evidence
was procuring it by theft, which would render the meat unsuitable.
Further, Beetz J. found that while the appellants had alleged in their
130. Ibid. at para. 60.
131. Supra note 3.
132. Supra note 7.
133. Jack and Charlie v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 641.
134. The ceremony entailed the burning of the deer meat to satisfy the spirit of the relative's
deceased great-grandfather. For further discussion of this case, see the reference infra, note 135.
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factum that the use of defrosted raw deer meat was sacrilegious, there was
insufficient evidence led to indicate the truth of that assertion.'35
While the Supreme Court of Canada denied the appellants the ability
to claim the incidental right to kill a deer out of season in order to facilitate
the exercise of the burning ceremony in Jack and Charlie, it would seem
that, in appropriate circumstances, the exercise of such incidental rights
would be vindicated. However, in R. v. Van der Peet,'36 an aboriginal
fishing rights case, Lamer C.J.C.'s majority judgment determined that
necessarily incidental rights, or rights that "piggybacked" upon recog-
nized aboriginal rights, were not themselves protected under section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.'37 His judgment held that an aborigi-
nal activity could only be a constitutionally-protected aboriginal right if
it was an element of a practice, tradition, or custom integral to the
distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right that could be
traced to pre-contact practices.' 38
In Marshall, however, Binnie J.'s majorityjudgment characterized the
right to obtain goods to trade as necessarily incidental to the right to bring
goods to trade and, therefore, an equally protected treaty right. While this
element of Marshall stands in direct contrast with the Van der Peet
judgment, it is consistent with the discussion of incidental rights in other
treaty rights cases. For instance, in the Supreme Court's judgment in
Simon, 139 the Court explicitly stated that practices that were reasonably
incidental to treaty rights were themselves protected rights. In Simon, a
Mi'kmaq member of the Shubenacadie Indian Brook Band (No. 2) was
charged with unlawfully possessing a rifle and shotgun cartridge, con-
trary to section 150(1) of the Nova Scotia Lands and Forests Act. 4'
Simon maintained that he possessed a treaty right to hunt pursuant to the
Mi'kmaq Treaty of 1752 and that his possession of the rifle and cartridge
135. In J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It
Make a Difference?" (1997)36 Alta. L. Rev. 9 at 43, the authors argue that the Supreme Court's
consideration of the practice in question solely by reference to the nature of the deer meat
neglects the cultural and legal contexts within which the ceremony in question was performed.
As such, the Court failed to consider all relevant issues in determining whether the action
engaged in was necessarily incidental to the aboriginal right in question.
136. Supra note 7.
137. As I argued in an earlier article, the compartmentalization of aboriginal practices into
"integral" and "incidental" rights in Van der Peet "demonstrates a profound inability or
reluctance to recognize that Aboriginal rights ought to be understood as broad, theoretical
constructs... [which] deflects attention away from what ought to be the true issue at hand,
namely the ability of Aboriginal peoples to determine the precise methods by which they will
make use of or implement their larger, abstract rights": see "Taking Aim," supra note 31 at 43-
44, note 124.
138. Supra note 7 at 539.
139. Supra note 8.
140. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 163.
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was a necessary incident of the exercise of that right. In addition to finding
that Simon possessed a treaty right to hunt pursuant to the 1752 treaty,
Dickson C.J.C. held that for that right to be effective, it must also include
activities "reasonably incidental" to the act of hunting. 4' These "inciden-
tal rights" were found to include "travelling with the requisite hunting
equipment to the hunting grounds."1 42
In the Supreme Court's recent examination of treaty rights in Sun-
down, Cory J.'s unanimous judgment also affirms the protection of rights
incidental to the exercise of treaty rights. The respondent, a Treaty No. 6
Cree Indian, constructed a 30 foot by 40 foot log cabin in a provincial park
in Saskatchewan in 1992 to facilitate his exercise of his treaty hunting
rights. He was charged with constructing a dwelling on park land without
a disposition or the prior written consent of the minister. In his defence,
Sundown maintained that he needed to build the cabin in order to hunt.
Members of his band engaged in "expedition hunting," a hub-and-spoke
style of hunting that had long been practised in the area where the park
was established. These hunts were carried out over extended periods of
time, ranging from overnight to two weeks in duration. Hunters would
establish a base camp that they would venture from each day and return
to in the evening to smoke fish or game, prepare hides, and sleep. The
cabin constructed by Sundown was used for these very purposes.
In determining that the construction of the cabin was necessarily
incidental to Sundown's treaty right to hunt and therefore protected by s.
35(1), Cory J. held that to understand the term "reasonably incidental" as
it was used in Simon, it must be asked whether "a reasonable person, fully
apprised of the relevant manner of hunting or fishing, [would] consider
the activity in question reasonably related to the act of hunting or
fishing." 143 This "reasonable person" was dispassionate, fully apprised of
141. Supra note 8 at 403.
142. Ibid. at 403.
143. Supra note 3 at 409.
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the treaty holder's rights, and aware of the manner in which the First
Nation in question hunted and fished at the time the treaty was signed.'
44
In constructing a definition of what constitutes an activity "reasonably
incidental" to a right to hunt, Cory J. stated that it would be one "which
allows the claimant to exercise the right in the manner that his or her
ancestors did, taking into account acceptable modem developments or
unforeseen alterations in the right."'' 45 According to Cory J., such
incidental activities "are not only those which are essential, or integral,
but include, more broadly, activities which are meaningfully related or
linked."' 4 6 He did restrict the scope of reasonably incidental activities to
those that were incidental to an actually practised treaty right.
From Sundown, Cory J. established that determining whether an
activity was reasonably incidental to a treaty right was "largely" factual
and historical. The focus of such inquiry was not premised upon the
essentiality of the activity in order for the right to be exercised, but upon
whether the activity was understood, both historically and contemporar-
ily, as "significantly connected" to the right in question. Since there was
no dispute that Sundown's band traditionally hunted in an expeditionary
style and that without shelter this method of hunting would be impossible,
Cory J. determined that a shelter was a necessary, and hence reasonably
incidental, element of his treaty-protected method of hunting.
It should be noted that Sundown, like Marshall, did not demonstrate
any recognition of the contradiction between the treatment of reasonably
incidental rights in Van der Peet and Simon. Although Cory J. discussed
the Van der Peet case in his judgment, no mention of Lamer C.J.C.'s
distinction between primary and incidental rights was made. 47 From
these cases, as indicated earlier, a situation has developed whereby
144. Ibid. Although it should be emphasized that Cory J. explained, ibid. that it was necessary
to avoid a "frozen rights" approach to the exercise of the rights in question:
That knowledge must, of course, be placed to some extent in today's context. For
example, in the past it was reasonably incidental to hunting rights to carry a quiver of
arrows. Today it is reasonably incidental to hunting rights to carry the appropriate box
of shotgun shells or rifle cartridges. A form of shelter was always necessary to carry out
the expeditionary hunting of the Joseph Bighead First Nation. At the time of the treaty,
the shelter may have been a carefully built lean-to. That shelter appropriately evolved
to a tent and then a small cabin. Thus, the reasonable person, informed of the manner
of hunting at the time of the treaty, can consider it in the light of modem hunting methods
and can determine whether the activity in question - the shelter - is reasonably
incidental to the fight to hunt.
145. Ibid. at 409-10.
146. Ibid. at 410.
147. The fact that neither Sundown nor Marshall distinguished Lamer C.J.C.'s statements on
incidental rights in Van der Peet, or cited Van der Peet's discussion of this issue at all is rather
peculiar, insofar as Lamer C,J.C. sat on the Sundown and Marshall appeals.
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practices reasonably incidental to the exercise of aboriginal rights are not
constitutionally protected, but practices reasonably incidental to the
exercise of treaty rights are. Although Van derPeet is an aboriginal rights
case, while Simon, Sundown, and Marshall are treaty rights cases, there
is nothing inherent in those cases, or in the nature of aboriginal rights-
as opposed to treaty rights-to suggest that practices that are reasonably
incidental to the former and which facilitate their practice ought not be
protected along with those rights, while practices reasonably incidental
to treaty rights ought to be protected as part of those same rights.
148
Of further note is that in Sundown Cory J. held that in determining what
constitutes a reasonably incidental act related to the contemporary
exercise of treaty rights one must account for unforeseen alterations in the
right. Similarly, in Marshall Binnie J. expressly held that courts are not
to understand treaty rights as if they are "frozen-in-time."1 49 These
findings are directly opposed to the tenor of Lamer C.J.C.'s majority
judgment in Van der Peet, where he stated that constitutionally protected
aboriginal rights are restricted to those practices which predated Euro-
pean settlement or can be traced to such practices. Why aboriginal rights
were deemed in Van der Peet not to be capable of unforeseen alteration
in light of post-contact events while treaty rights may be capable of such
alteration post-treaty is not made clear through the judgments. Again,
there is nothing inherent in the distinction between aboriginal and treaty
rights that would warrant such a differentiation being made.
The failure of Marshall, and Sundown before it, to address the Van der
Peetjudgment's treatment of incidental rights and the evolution of rights,
just as Van der Peet did not attempt to reconcile its findings with those in
Simon, has seemingly resulted in the treatment of those rights by the
Supreme Court in a juristic vacuum. However, the Court has sometimes
regarded aboriginal and treaty rights interchangeably, as in the applica-
tion of the Sparrow justificatory test to treaty rights in cases such as
Badger and Catj and the "creation" of the Badger test in Marshall. '50
What is problematic about this development is that the Supreme Court
has not explained why it treats aboriginal and treaty rights separately at
times and interchangeably at others.
148. For further discussion of the differences between aboriginal and treaty rights, see L.I.
Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justifica-
tory Test" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149 [hereinafter "Defining Parameters"].
149. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 53.
150. Further discussion of this point will be found in Part VII, "Justification and the 'Badger'
Test," below.
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While aboriginal and treaty rights must be recognized as independent
forms of rights, in some circumstances it is not inappropriate to discuss
them together. That being said, it is clear that they should only be
discussed together where that discussion recognizes the important dis-
tinctions between them. Unfortunately, this has not always happened in
Canadian jurisprudence. Most recently, the failure to distinguish between
aboriginal and treaty rights may be seen in the adoption of the Sparrow
justificatory test to treaty rights in cases such as Badger, Cbti, and
Sundown.
VII. Justification and the "Badger Test"
Both the majority and dissenting judgments in Marshall unequivocally
endorse the notion that the justificatory test originally established in
relation to aboriginal rights in Sparrow, subsequently expanded upon in
Gladstone, and ultimately sanctioned in its expanded manner in
Delgamuukw applies equally to treaty rights. In fact, there is repeated
reference to the application of the "Badger test" which is said to denote
this principle.
Interestingly, in the Badger case there was no mention of any "test"
that would allow for the justification of limitations on treaty rights.
Rather, Cory J.'s majority judgment held that the principles established
in Sparrow would apply equally to treaty scenarios. However, his
endorsement of this conclusion was significantly equivocal. Specifically,
in Badger Cory J. stated that, although thejustificatory test formulated in
Sparrow was applied to aboriginal rights and made no mention of its
potential bearing upon treaty rights, the test applied to treaty rights "in
most cases."'' As well, although noting that treaty rights, unlike aborigi-
nal rights, were the result of mutual agreement, he held that both forms
of rights could be unilaterally abridged.'52 He did find, however, that
there were "significant aspects of similarity" between aboriginal and
treaty rights. Included in this similarity were the "unique, sui generis
nature" of both forms of rights, their implication of the honour of the
Crown, and the wording of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which he held "supports a common approach to infringements of Ab-
original and treaty rights."'
1 3
151. Supra note 4 at 105.
152. Ibid. at 105-6.
153. Ibid.
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From these statements, it would appear that Justice Cory's conclusion
that the infringement of treaty rights ascribes to the same justificatory
standard as the infringement of aboriginal rights comes not from the
nature of treaty rights as compared with aboriginal rights, but from the
fact that both forms of rights co-exist in section 35(1) and therefore are
to be treated in an identical fashion. Indeed, his conclusion is based on the
same principles established in two earlier Ontario Court of Appeal cases,
R. v. Bombay'5' and R. v. Fox.15 In Bombay, Austin'J.A. arrived at this
conclusion in the following manner:
The Sparrow case dealt with Aboriginal rights. The language of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in that case, however, is equally
applicable to treaty rights. In R. v. Joseph, [ 1990] 4 C.N.L.R. 59 (B.C.S.C.)
Murphy J. held that the framework provided by the Supreme Court in
Sparrow "applies also to treaty rights." I agree.
5 6
Nowhere else in the judgment was there any mention of reasons for the
application of the Sparrow test to treaty rights. In Fox, it was simply said
that "[i]n R. v. Sparrow, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the
framework analysis for assessing the constitutionality of legislation
affecting treaty and Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed under s.
35( 1).''157
From these cases, it may be seen that there is no principled basis upon
which the Sparrow test was applied to treaty rights. Indeed, the statement
in Fox is simply incorrect, since the Sparrow case said nothing about the
application of its justificatory standard to treaty rights. As I suggested in
an earlier article, "it appears as though the placing together of [aboriginal
and treaty rights] in s. 35(1) was solely responsible for the Sparrow test's
application to treaty rights, not because of any reasoned analysis of why
treaty rights should be treated like Aboriginal rights with respect to their
limitation by governmental legislative initiatives."'58 Badger simply
continued this trend. When the Supreme Court of Canada released its
subsequent judgment in R. v. Crtj, it sanctioned the application of the
Sparrow test to treaty rights without providing any further rationale for
such a conclusion other than citing Badger.'59 As Lamer C.J.C. explained
in that case:
154. [1993] 1 C.N.L.R. 92 (Ont. C.A.).
155. [1994] 3 C.N.L.R. 132 (Ont. C.A.).
156. Supra note 154 at 9 4 .
157. Supra note 155 at 136.
158. "Defining Parameters," supra note 148 at 152.
159. R. v. Cote, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, [199614 C.N.L.R. 26 at 40-41 [hereinafter Cote cited
to C.N.L.R.].
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As a general rule, where a claimant challenges the application of a federal
regulation under s.35(1), the characterization of the right alternatively as
an Aboriginal right or as a treaty right will not be of any consequence..
as the Sparrow test for infringement and justification applies with the
same force and the same considerations to both species of constitutional
rights: R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at paras. 37, 77 and 78 and 79. 16o
Interestingly, while the Cbt, case approved the principle established in
Badger, it did not make any reference to a "Badger test."
Between Cbtj and Marshall came the Sundown case.'6' While the
Marshall case contemplates the existence of a Badger test, Cory J.'s
unanimous judgment in Sundown makes no reference to such a test. In
Sundown, the Court held that the applicable standard forjustifying limits
on treaty rights was the test articulated in Sparrow. If a "Badger test"
which applied justificatory standards to existing treaty rights contained
in section 35(1) was in place, why would Cory J. not have made reference
to it, but instead to thejustificatory test for the infringement of aboriginal
rights in Sparrow? This curiosity is magnified by the fact that Cory J.
delivered the majority judgment for the Court in Badger.
With all of the media reference to judicial activism surrounding the
Marshall judgment and the contention that the Supreme Court has
"created" rights through its interpretation of the truckhouse clause,
perhaps the judicial creation of the Badger test is yet another manifesta-
tion of such activism. The primary distinction, however, between the
majority's interpretation of the meaning and effect of the truckhouse
clause and its contemplation of a Badger test is that the former is premised
upon a "necessary implications" argument, similar to that found in cases
such as Alberta Government Telephones162 and Bombay (Province of) v.
Bombay (City of),163 whereas the latter is -simply contemplated without
160. Ibid. at 40-41. Later in the Cbrd judgment, at 55-56, Chief Justice Lamer held that "it is
quite clear that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is alleged to have infringed an
Aboriginal or treaty right... The text and purpose of s.35(1) do not distinguish between federal
and provincial laws which restrict Aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be subject
to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny." While Lamer C.J.C. placed his emphasis on
section 3 5 (l)'s failure to distinguish between federal and provincial laws which restrict such
rights, he did think to ask whether there was reason to distinguish between aboriginal and treaty
rights for the purpose of justification.
161. Supranote3.
162. Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (CRTC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225, 61 D.L.R.
(4th) 193.
163. [1947] A.C. 58 (P.C.). This "necessary implications" argument holds that where a
statute that expressly applies to one, but not both, levels of government would be frustrated or
rendered absurd unless it was read to apply to both levels of government, the statute, by
necessity or logical implication, must be understood to apply to both levels. See also Friends
of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [ 19921 1 S.C.R. 3, 88 D.L.R.
(4th) 1.
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reference to where in Badger such a test was developed or where it
otherwise came from. As a result of the lack of reasoning by the majority
judgment in Badger pertaining to the application of the Sparrow test to
treaty rights, perhaps the justificatory test for treaty rights could equally
have been called the "Ct test," since Cte provided no greater rationale
for this conclusion than did Badger.
Given the above discussion, if the Supreme Court in Marshall has
determined that there is such a beast as the "Badger test," it remains to be
seen whether that test is identical to the Sparrow test. The principles
espoused in Marshall appear to indicate that the tests are the same. If that
is the case, then it ought be asked why there is a need for a Badger test at
all. If the "tests" are the same, it would seem sufficient to state, as was
done in Badger, that the Sparrow test applies equally to aboriginal and
treaty rights. In Marshall, however, Binnie J. stated that the Sparrow test
was "adapted to apply to treaties in Badger,"'64 thereby bringing into
question the extent of the adaptation. The Supreme Court's decision to
simultaneously uphold both the Sparrow and Badger tests, applying to
aboriginal and treaty rights respectively, could be read to suggest that
there is either a matter of redundancy at play or that the tests are not the
same. While the former is a distinct possibility, having two identical tests
described by different names depending on whether the principles they
contain were applied to aboriginal (Sparrow) or treaty (Badger) rights
could also indicate the Court's recognition of the significant distinction
between aboriginal and treaty rights. Indeed, Cory J.' s majorityjudgment
in Badger bears this suggestion out, as indicated by the following
commentary:
There is no doubt that Aboriginal and treaty fights differ in both origin and
structure. Aboriginal rights flow from the customs and traditions of the
Native peoples. To paraphrase the words of Judson J. in Calder... they
embody the right of Native people to continue living as their forefathers
lived. Treaty rights, on the other hand, are those contained in official
agreements between the Crown and the Native people .... They create
enforceable obligations based on the mutual consent of the parties.
1 65
If the Supreme Court has recognized that aboriginal and treaty rights
are not the same, but has nevertheless stated that the Sparrowjustificatory
test applies to treaty rights and has gone as far as to describe that test's
application to treaty situations as the Badger test, then perhaps the second
possibility posited above-that the tests are not the same-is the correct
164. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 48. Note the use of the word "adapt" as opposed
to "adopt," thereby suggesting some degree of change.
165. Supra note 4 at 105.
Marshalling Principles From The Marshall Morass
one. More importantly, since the Court has recognized the distinction
between aboriginal and treaty rights, it is questionable how it could apply
the Sparrow standard, which is based on unilateral restrictions of rights
in appropriate, or necessary, circumstances, 166 to treaties which are
consensual documents between parties. Indeed, in Sundown, Cory J.
referred to his judgment in Badger, where he stated that "[t]reaties may
appear to be no more than contracts. Yet they are far more. They are a
solemn exchange of promises made by the Crown and various First
Nations."'
167
Where an exchange of solemn promises exists, how can it be that one
of the parties to that exchange may unilaterally alter the nature of the
agreement reached? Perhaps more telling of the application of the Badger
test in this regard is that the only party that may unilaterally alter the
nature of a treaty agreement is the Crown. The majority's sanction of the
application of the Sparrow test to treaty rights in Marshall, renaming this
application the Badger test in the process, derogates significantly from
the positive aspects of its interpretation of treaties. The reaffirmation of
the Badger test in Marshall No. 2-where the Court stated that "The
Court in Badger extended to treaties the justificatory standard developed
for aboriginal rights in Sparrow, supra"-is a continuation of the unques-
tioned, unprincipled assumption that began in Badger and was continued
in Marshall. 1
61
While the repetition of propositions results in a familiarity that may
connote authority, even in law, 16 9 such repetition is unwarranted where
the propositions being repeated have no principled or legitimate basis.
166. In Sparrow, supra note 10, justification was to be used only where it was "absolutely
necessary," while in Gladstone, supra note 11, the Court held that justification was applicable
where it was "pressing and substantial." While this distinction may be purely semantical, it is
suggested that this change in the wording used is indicative of the lessening of the standard for
justification from Sparrow to Gladstone. This lessening of the justificatory standard may also
be seen in the shift from Sparrow's finding that "public interest" was too vague to serve as a
legitimate basis for justifying limitations of aboriginal rights to Gladstone's ruling that
competing, but non-constitutionally-protected interests of non-aboriginals could be validly
used to justify limiting aboriginal rights where the public interest would be served by such a
finding.
167. Supra note 3 at 407 [emphasis added].
168. Supra note 2 at para. 32.
169. 1 have argued that the same effect may be seen in relation to the Guerin case, supra note
95, and the authority of its proposition that "the Crown" holds fiduciary obligations to
aboriginal peoples, which has been relied upon by subsequent judicial considerations without
any discussion of which emanation of the Crown owes those duties or the ramifications of a
finding of fiduciary relations between the Crown and aboriginal peoples in Canada: see L.I.
Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
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When considering thejuristic merits of the application of the Sparrow or
Badger tests to treaty rights, something more than the hollow rhetoric that
has been expressed in cases such as Marshall is required for those tests
to properly be applied to treaty rights.
Conclusion
For all of the criticism that the case has received, the Supreme Court of
Canada's judgment in Marshall neither creates any new legal principles,
nor does it truly extend the application of existing doctrine. It is, at its
roots, an affirmation of the status quo, notwithstanding the outlandish
claims of some about its devastating effects on non-aboriginal access to
natural resources or the incessant claims that the Supreme Court is, once
again, "creating" law rather than interpreting it. Indeed, it may be
plausibly argued that one of the reasons for the release of Marshall No.
2170 in the form that it took was to address and dismiss such claims. In any
event, these predictions more closely resemble the prognostications of
Chicken Little than Nostradamus.
The importance of the Marshalljudgment as a precedent rests not upon
the affirmation of the various canons of treaty interpretation that had
previously been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Sundown and Badger, but with the manner in which the majority
judgment gave practical effects to those interpretative canons. Perhaps
the true legacy of the Marshall case lies in its recognition that the spirit
and intent, rather than merely the literal terms, of a treaty are worthy of
judicial recognition and implementation. Binnie J.'s statement that "the
surviving substance of the treaty is not the literal promise of a truckhouse,
but a treaty right to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and
fishing by trading the products of those traditional activities"'' is
illustrative of this appreciation of a broader-based understanding of what
constitutes a treaty, The Privy Council expressed a similar sentiment in
the New Zealand Maori Council case, where Lord Woolf explained, in
relation to the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840, that:
170. Supra note 2.
171. Marshall, SCC, supra note I at para. 56.
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Both the Act of 1975 and the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 refer to
the "principles" of the Treaty. In their Lordships' opinion the "principles"
are the underlying mutual obligations and responsibilities which the
Treaty places on the parties. They reflect the intent of the Treaty as a whole
and include, but are not confined to, the express terms of the Treaty.
(Bearing in mind the period of time which has elapsed since the date of the
Treaty and the very different circumstances to which it now applies, it is
not surprising that the Acts do not refer to the terms of the Treaty). With
the passage of time, the "principles" which underlie the Treaty have
become much more important than its precise terms.'72
By incorporating the spirit and intent of treaties into their legal
interpretation, a more well-rounded appreciation of the understanding of
the parties at the time the treaty was signed is possible. That enables
courts to apply historic treaties and treaty rights in a meaningful, contem-
porary way which allows for the evolution of those rights, but maintains
fidelity to the original purpose of the treaties and the understandings of
the parties thereto. If this is to be the Marshall case's ultimate legacy, then
it will properly occupy an important place in the history of Canadian
aboriginal rights jurisprudence for this proposition alone.
172. New Zealand Maori Council v. A. -G. of New Zealand, [ 1994] 1 A.C. 466 at 475 (P.C.).
